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ARGUMENT 
I. IP SECTION 34-28-8 DOES NOT MEAN WHAT 
IT'S PLAIN LANGUAGE INDICATES, THEN THE 
INTERPRETATION PROPOSED BY RDG IN IT'S 
BRIEF IS A REASONABLE ALTERNATIVE. 
RDG urges the court tc dtioj. > i . 1 nr Dretat i on of 
oetiHiH, H* ,'il n • Utah Code 1985-1986, tnat wruid uliciii'-it1 
language from its present I in in; Whenever any person shall 
contract with anothei: for th*. pei - 3 
"
,
""vilie.iit,'V"SM ,i business shall o.-ntract ^^ another i^: 
performance of a porl.n. W U X A UJL business: The 
first argument in RDG"s brief 
"The Utah wage payment statute was intended 
to impose liability for payment of wages 
only on parties who contracted their work 
out to independent contractors rather than 
employing such persons directly." 
T; t;;t. ' '* V * ; i , - . b-8 does not mean what 
its plain language -^*. retation proposed by 
RDG is a reasonable alternative. 
ASSUJ RDG's interpretatic : " adopted K,tT the 
court, the statute would sti. .*-'** wi C 
1 - *aue" r Mef ; '; employees . «a - es 
(*-,: *cij: * ^!»n* * rusiness . > therefore 
necessary ti -:etermii-*- assess RDG's 
- >• s-rt LO t ,- - - - i " _ne 
court concer; * business :^s partnership 
certificate, 86-94 ,; iti.-i, M.,.I r-nG's business 
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"... to acquire, hold, develop, operate, and 
manage certain real property situated in 
Park City, Summit County, State of Utah ..." 
Part of the trade and business of RDG is to "develop", i.e., 
build improvements on, land at Deer Valley. In accord with its 
business, RDG entered into a contract with T & K Steel, Inc. to 
construct condominiums on its property. The employees of T & K 
Steel, Inc. expended their efforts in furtherance of RDG's 
business. Therefore, even if RDG's proposed interpretation is 
applied to the facts in this case, RDG would still be liable 
for the unpaid wages because it was the constructive employer 
of T & K Steel's employees. 
RDG states that its interpretation of Section 34-28-8 
is in harmony with the workers1 compensation statutes. It 
represents on page 7 of its brief that there is a "long line of 
Utah workmen's compensation cases holding that the making of a 
contract for the construction of a building by one who is not 
engaged in the construction business does not constitute the 
conducting of a 'trade or business1...." Of the "long line" of 
cases RDG cites only one, Lee v. Chevron Oil Company, 565 P. 2d 
1128 (Utah 1977), a case that finds cleaning storage tanks to 
be a necessary part of Chevron Oil Company's business and 
determines it is therefore liable under the workers' 
compensation statutes to the employees of an independent 
contractor*who cleaned Chevron's storage tanks. 
If the workers' compensation statutes are the analog 
of Section 34-28-8, as RDG argues, then it would appear that 
the ruling in Lee supports the position of the Industrial 
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c . • :f -i • company Is liable *-o ^be e.'nj *- id 
independe., ^ontractec v , ^ storage tanks 
because cleaniru storage tanxs Jisiness 
c 4-k> • :'• -v-iji.! -^ <„ • follow that ; : - sr 
3s Ldi-fxc ,> .- * aii independent contracted 
contracted : construe: improvements i «-/ ;.*i-
1
 ucting ri ) /ements a .a y.a. 
business ^. 
The trial judge determined nqaged in 
\ ' ness (see Judge Rigtrup b iiiici^i.t. 
findings ui ^ judgme- - A 
there i *~ absolutely nothing - M*. . . 1 a. 
find 
If contracting . - ' roperty is a part 
ind levelopmeir. .usiness, x.-i . .- ^ .d 
interpretdt • liable : ^2>u- r > K 
Steel's employees -:e:- determine 
RDGfs business, u;._ _u.3t* should t>e remanded i 
proceedings• 
T T . wiTHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE FACTS PRESENTED IN 
THIS CASE, THERE IS NO BASIS FOR DECLARING 
EITHER SECTION 34-28-8 OR SECTION 14-2-2 THE 
SOLE REMEDY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION HAS 
AGAINST RDG. 
* . . * - r *> before the court it appears 
that liability ma> . - establisheG :e^tmn 
3 < f contends that oe< t.ui, . ^ 
sole remedy mmission ^,::,^t RDG because 
Section _i-, • :J. ,p e ^ : JI applicab-
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construction trades and Section 34-28-8 deals with all labor 
and is therefore superceded. 
This argument infers that the legislature desired to 
treat members of the building construction trades inferior to 
other laborers* Under RDG's theory Section 34-28-8 does not 
apply to building construction laborers because it is 
superceded by Section 14-2-2; therefore, a laborer who works on 
a contruction project valued at less than $2,000.00 would not 
have a claim against the owner because Section 14-2-2 is 
applicable only in cases where the contract is for more than 
$2,000.00. Since Section 34-28-8 does not have a threshold 
amount, any laborer from a trade other than building 
construction has a cause of action against the person who 
(under RDG's interpretation) contracts out his work to an 
independent contractor. 
There is no legislative justification for discriminating 
against building construction workers in this manner. The two 
statutes should be construed in such a manner that all workers, 
regardless of their specific trade, are treated equally. 
In this case the contract amount was in excess of five 
million dollars and RDG did to require T & K Steel to provide a 
payment bond, therefore, RDG may be liable under Section 14-2-2 and 
Section 34-28-8. In this case the statutes are harmonious. The 
facts in this case do not present the fact situation where the 
court would be forced to chose between the applicability of Section 
14-2-2 and Section 34-28-8, that conflict would only be presented 
where the contract price was less than $2,000.00. 
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III. RDG DID NOT ADDRESS ITSELF TO THE SECOND 
ARGUMENT RAISED BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
IN ITS APPELLANT'S BRIEF — THE FAILURE OF 
RDG TO FILE A COST BOND ON APPEAL. 
In its Respondent's Brief, RDG did not respond to the 
second argument of the Industrial Commission, that is, the 
failure of RDG to file a cost bond on appeal. The district 
court lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter because a cost 
bond was not filed and the appeal of RDG from the order of the 
Industrial Commission should be dismissed and the order of the 
Industrial Commission reinstated. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ §7~3ay of July, 1986. 
M X JAYSTONi 
Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant, 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
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